國立臺灣大學哲學論評

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This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can be clarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis－pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis—are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. ‘Pure sensus communis’ is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. ‘Ideal sensus communis’ is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes “pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.