On Moral Metaphysics: The Debate Between Mou Zongsan and Lao Siguang
Author：Tzu-Li Chang
Abstract / PDF Download
Mou Zongsan regards Confucianism, particularly Song-Ming Neo Confucianism, as a type of moral metaphysics, which bridges the gap between morality and being, metaphysics and ethics. According to Mou, Lu-Wang School is categorized as moral metaphysics as well. In contrast, Lao Siguang has an issue with this characterization on grounds that Lu-Wang School deals only with morality without engaging in an ontological interpretation of value. Moral metaphysics fits with Wang Yangming’s theory of liangzhi in that liangzhi is defined as the metaphysical principle giving rise to all existing things. Lao adopts a de facto interpretation of tian-dao, tian-li, and sheng-sheng, so that the two theoretical problems, determinism and the coexistence of life and death, inevitably ensue. From an anthropocosmic perspective, Mou takes tian-dao, tian-li, and sheng-sheng as elements of metaphysical theorizing, and therefore the two sticklers proposed by Lao no longer exist. For the above reasons, depicting Confucianism as moral metaphysics can be justified. Nevertheless, Lao’s opposing viewpoint is also credited with unearthing the implicit issue of transforming tian-dao into an empty concept in Mou’s articulation of moral metaphysics.