On Allison’s Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Freedom
Author：Wen-Berng Pong
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The main concern of this paper is Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom which received heavy criticism. Basically he divides Kant’s theory of freedom into two different periods, namely the period of semi-critical moral theory around 1781 and the period of mature theory of freedom in second Critique. In the first part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom by Allison, he tries to develop the first period of Kant’s theory of freedom based on the texts of the first Critique. His main thesis is the following: In the semi-critical period, Kant tries to construct a theory of
rational agency based on the concept of practical freedom. In the third part of Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Allison argues further that Kant develops a new theory of freedom in order to justify the use of practical freedom, and in the center of this justification lies the concept of transcendental freedom. Allison claimed that Kant did not solve the problem of transcendental freedom in Groundwork III until the publication of the second Critique. He called Kant’s arguments “Reciprocity Thesis” and “Doctrine of fact of pure reason”.
The main objective of this paper attempts to reconstruct Allison’s arguments, and on some crucial points, add some comments.