The connectionist sceptic versus the “full-blooded” semanticist
Author：Francisco Calvo Carz
Abstract /
Gareth Evans produced a powerful line of argument against Quine’s well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evens argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories à la Quine are an easy prey for Evans’ considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans’ criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy” and the friend of connectionism sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy” and the friend of connectionism, I shall contend that the Quinean has nothing to fear from a classical reading of Evans’ considerations.